Fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices and countermeasures

Dear colleague,

BSC-DAC-UPC invite you to attend online the following talk:

Title: Fault injection attacks on cryptographic devices and countermeasures
Speaker: Israel Koren (Professor of ECE, Umass Amherst)
Date: Thu 28, 12:00 CET
URL: http://www.ac.upc.edu/video/index,en.html

If you would like to ask questions to the speaker, please send an e-mail to seminar@hipeac.ac.upc.edu

Best regards,

Enric Morancho
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Abstract

Numerous schemes for extracting the secret key out of cryptographic devices
using side channel attacks have been developed. One of the most effective side
channel attacks is through maliciously injecting faults into the device and
observing the erroneous results produced by the device. In some extreme cases,
a single fault injection experiment has been shown to be sufficient for
retrieving the secret key.

In this talk we describe several fault injection attacks on symmetric key and
public key ciphers and outline countermeasures that have been developed to
protect cryptographic devices against such attacks. We then show that some of
these countermeasures do not provide the desired protection, and even worse,
they may make other side channel attacks easier to mount.

Bio

Israel Koren is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst and a fellow of the IEEE. He has been a
consultant to companies like IBM, Analog Devices, Intel, AMD and National
Semiconductors. His research interests include Fault-Tolerant systems, secure
cryptographic devices, VLSI yield and reliability and Computer Arithmetic. He
publishes extensively and has over 200 publications in refereed journals and
conferences. He is the author of the textbook "Computer Arithmetic Algorithms,"
2nd Edition, A.K. Peters, Ltd., 2002, a co-author of the textbook "Fault
Tolerant Systems," Morgan-Kaufman, 2007. He co-founded in 2004 and co-organized
the annual workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC,
which has become the main conference for presenting new fault injection
attacks and countermeasures.